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Despite headline-grabbing stories about elite researchers leaving one country for another or
one firm for another,1 very little is known about the efficiency properties of the labor market
for researchers. A firm that hires a very talented researcher increases its R&D output and
profits, but may cause other firms to settle for someone with lower scientific talent. A
frictionless labor market matches each researcher to the firm that values him or her the
most. However, in the presence of positive externalities such as knowledge spillovers, there
is no presumption that the equilibrium allocation of researchers to firms also maximizes the
positive externality that each firm generates. This paper discusses whether and under what
conditions a trade-off exists between the assignment of researchers to firms maximizing the
private value of knowledge production and the one maximizing the social value of knowledge
production.
I consider a theoretical model in which several firms produce new knowledge by building
labs and hiring researchers in a frictionless labor market. Researchers are a non-homogeneous
input in the production of knowledge and are characterized by their ability. Each lab is an
aggregate of all other inputs in the production of new knowledge (e.g., machines, technicians,
raw material), and is characterized by its size that is, the size of the investment required to
build it. The knowledge produced within a firm increases with the ability of the researcher
hired and the size of the lab built.2 Furthermore, I assume that researcher’s ability and
lab size are complements in the knowledge production function, so that total knowledge
produced in the economy is maximized under a Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) rule,
assigning the most productive researcher to work in the largest lab. Because of knowledge
spillovers, each firm benefits from the knowledge produced by all other firms.
As a first step to my analysis, I take the distribution of labs as given and show that
the market allocation of researchers to firms depends on how fast the firms’ marginal return
1 For example, see “Steal This Scientist” M. Liu, Newsweek, 14th of November 2009 (accessed from
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/11/13/steal-this-scientist.html). See also “Climbing Mount
Publishable: The Old Scientific Powers Are Starting to Lose Their Grip” The Economist, 11th of November
2010 (accessed from http://www.economist.com/node/17460678).
2 Lab size may be determined by the lab physical size, by the number of people (technicians, post-docs)
working in it, but also by the quality and productivity of its machines and staff. However, for the sake of
clarity, I use terms related to quantity (i.e., size) when referring to labs, and to quality (i.e., ability) when
referring to researchers.
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on its research activities decreases with the amount of knowledge produced. When the
marginal return decreases slowly, researchers and labs are complements from the firm’s point
of view. It follows that the market allocation of researchers to labs is PAM, which also
maximizes aggregate knowledge production. On the other hand, if the marginal return
decreases fast, the two inputs in the production of new knowledge—labs and researchers—
may be substitutes in the firms’ objective function. In this case, the market allocation of
researchers to labs is Negative Assortative Matching (NAM), in which the most productive
researcher in the economy is hired by the firm with the smallest lab. It follows that, for any
given distribution of labs, the private sector minimizes the amount of knowledge produced:
the decentralized allocation of researchers to labs is inefficient.
Furthermore, if firms’ return on knowledge production is an iso-elastic function, then the
equilibrium allocation is NAM or PAM depending on whether this function is bounded or
unbounded above. Based on this observation, I argue that the allocation of researchers to
firms is likely to be inefficient if firms’ R&D activities are motivated by absorptive capacity,
which is the ability to find, understand, and use available public knowledge. For example,
it is well understood that R&D provides “a ticket of admission to an information network”
(Rosenberg, 1990; p. 170), and allows firms to become immediately aware of the latest
discoveries and inventions. Also, new knowledge may be difficult to understand and use in a
timely manner, unless a firm employs researchers who are familiar with the current scientific
and technological frontier. Producing new knowledge, therefore, causes an increase in a firms’
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).3 If this increase in absorptive capacity is
the only benefit generated by R&D activities, then, quite naturally, the private benefit from
producing knowledge has an upper bound given by the benefit of absorbing all publicly
available knowledge. In this case, assuming that the return on the production of knowledge
is iso-elastic, we should expect the allocation of researchers to labs to be inefficient.4
When the distribution of labs is endogenous, an additional source of inefficiency arises.
Each firm invests in its lab taking as given the researcher it will be matched with and the
3 On the empirical relevance of absorptive capacity, see Tilton (1971); Cockburn and Henderson (1998);
Gambardella (1992); Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2003, 2004).
4 Other mechanisms can generate a bounded private return on knowledge production and a misallocation
of scientific talent in equilibrium. For example, when experimenting in a lab failures can be socially valuable
because of learning. However, only successes are valuable from the firm point of view, generating a private
return on knowledge that can be very curved (see the conclusion of the paper for further details). Here I
focus on absorptive capacity because there is ample empirical evidence showing its importance for firms.
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stock of public knowledge available in the economy. This investment generates a positive
externality on other firms, which implies that, in equilibrium, firms build labs that are smaller
than the socially optimal size. Subsidies to firms’ investment in labs, however, cannot restore
efficiency because they do not affect the labor market for researchers. The first best can be
achieved by simultaneously subsidizing firms’ investments in labs and reallocating researchers
to firms.
The fact that the best researchers may not be hired by the firm with the largest labs
finds empirical support in the literature on firms’ size and R&D productivity, which shows
that small firms are often more productive than large firms in their R&D efforts. In the
model, the productivity of a lab is determined by the ability of the researcher hired. Hence,
when absorptive capacity is the dominant motive for science production the model predicts a
negative relationship between lab size and lab productivity. If large firms have a comparative
advantage at building labs (because of, for example, economies of scopes among different
research lines), they should build larger labs compared to smaller firms. If the equilibrium
matching pattern is NAM, we should therefore expect a negative relationship between lab
productivity and firm size. By looking at the number of patents produced in firms of different
sizes, several authors find results that support this prediction.5 More directly, Elfenbein,
Hamilton, and Zenger (2010) examine the allocation of researchers to firms and show that
productive R&D workers are more likely to work for small firms than for big firms.
Finally, I extend the model by assuming that producing new knowledge has an additional
benefit: it increases a researcher’s reputation. Because of a cash constraint, researchers
cannot transfer the value of reputation back to firms. I show that, if reputation concerns
are strong enough, the equilibrium in the private sector may switch from NAM to PAM.
Intuitively, when researchers’ reputation concerns are strong enough, they may receive most
of their compensation in the form of reputation rather than a monetary payment. Because
reputation increases with the amount of knowledge produced, researchers prefer to work
for firms with large labs. Hence, reputation may cause productive researchers to work for
firms with large labs, therefore increasing the knowledge produced in the economy and total
welfare.




Several papers have argued that equilibrium matching patterns may be inefficient and that
re-matching policies may increase welfare. However, in most of the existing literature, in-
efficient matching patterns emerge because peer effects and cash constraints prevent agents
from efficiently sharing the surplus generated within each match (see, for example, Este-
van, Gall, Legros, and Newman, 2017, who consider the problem of students sorting into
schools). In my model, instead, surplus can be freely shared among firms and researchers
by using wages. Nonetheless, the presence of widespread externalities in the form of knowl-
edge spillovers may lead to an inefficient matching pattern. Furthermore, in the presence
of widespread externalities, restricting the ability of agents to share surplus may lead to a
welfare improvement (see Section 4, where I introduce reputation concerns).
Matching markets with widespread externalities have been studied theoretically by Ham-
mond, Kaneko, and Wooders (1989), Hammond (1995), and Kaneko and Wooders (1996).
Hammond et al. (1989) and Kaneko and Wooders (1996) show the existence of the compet-
itive equilibrium in large economies with widespread externalities. Hammond (1995) show
existence of the equilibrium in economies with widespread externalities and different types
of taxes or subsidies. My paper studies the effect of widespread externalities in an applied,
policy-relevant matching problem. Also, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first one to
study a matching model in which there are both widespread externalities and a pre-matching
investment phase similar to Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001).
There is a large literature examining the determinants and the efficiency consequences
of the allocation of talent to different tasks and professions.6 Closest to my paper are
Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Celik (2014) and Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006). In
Acemoglu et al. (2014), managers can pursue either radical innovation or incremental in-
novation. In Vandenbussche et al. (2006), skilled and unskilled workers can be employed
either in innovative activities (i.e. pushing the knowledge frontier) or in the adoption of new
technology (i.e. reducing the distance to the knowledge frontier). Here, instead, I analyze
the allocation of scientific talent within the same sector and the same activity, and not the
allocation of scientific talent across sectors and activities. In particular, following the litera-
ture on absorptive capacity in my model creating new knowledge and reducing the distance
6 See for example Murphy et al. (1991); Baumol (1996); Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) and,
related to knowledge production, Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Lucas Jr and Moll (2014).
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to the knowledge frontier are byproducts of the same activity. Therefore, at a firm level
there is no trade-off between innovation and adoption of new knowledge, because they are
both increasing in the amount of R&D carried out. Despite this, a trade-off between the two
activities emerges endogenously in the assignment of researchers to labs.
Hammerschmidt (2009), Kamien and Zang (2000) and Leahy and Neary (2007) study
the theoretical implications of absorptive capacity, and show that it generates a new set
of strategic considerations for firms. I also study the theoretical implications of absorptive
capacity, but I abstract away from strategic considerations because each firm is assumed to
be small relative to the number of firms active on the labor market for researchers. My work
is also part of a growing literature recognizing that the inputs in the research process are non-
homogeneous, and that the way these inputs are combined is a key determinant of research
outcomes. Most papers in this literature are concerned with the determinants of research
team size (see, for example, Bikard, Murray, and Gans, 2015). Here I keep the number of
inputs in the production of knowledge fixed, and I argue that the sorting of research inputs
matters for aggregate research output.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a version
of the model in which the distribution of labs is exogenously given. In the third section,
I derive the distribution of labs endogenously. In the fourth section I introduce reputation
concerns. In the last section, I conclude. All proofs missing from the text are in appendix.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous firms and a continuum of het-
erogeneous researchers. Firms differ in the size (or productivity) of their lab L which is
continuously distributed over L = [L, L̄] with p.d.f. h(L). The distribution of labs is taken
as given here, but it is derived endogenously in Section 3. Researchers differ in their ability
a which is continuously distributed over A = [0, ā] with p.d.f. z(a).
Firms’ objective is to maximize profits, while researchers’ objective is to maximize their
wage. All agents have the same outside option, which is assumed to be zero. The economy
runs for two periods. In the first period each firm hires one researcher and produces new
knowledge; in the second period profits are realized and wages are paid.
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Period t = 1: producing new knowledge. In period t = 1, each firm hires one researcher
to work in the firm’s lab. The amount of knowledge produced within each lab is:
k = af(L),
where f(L) ≥ 0, f(0) = 0, f ′(L) > 0, and f ′′(L) ≤ 0.
The reader should interpret the lab size L as inclusive of all inputs that can increase
the chance of a scientific or technological discovery for given researcher’s ability, including
machines (e.g. a bigger telescope, a more powerful microscope and a state-of-the-art DNA
sequencing machine). Also, researchers typically work in teams. This fact can be incor-
porated into the model by defining a as the research team’s average quality. A previous
matching stage determines how researchers form research teams, and how the distribution
of a is determined from the distribution of individual ability. To keep the model as simple
as possible, I do not pursue this interpretation further.
Period t = 2: wages and profits. Call V the stock of public knowledge, available in the
economy at the beginning of period 2, and taken as given by firms and researchers. The
surplus generated within a firm depends on the knowledge produced in-house and on the
stock of public knowledge, so that:
ΦV (a, L) = φ(k, V )
s.t. k = af(L),
where φ(, ) is increasing in both arguments, with ∂
2φ(k,V )
∂k2
< 0 and φ(k = 0, V ) = 0 for
all V . For example, φ(k, V ) may represent the revenues earned by inventing new products
and bringing them to market. The surplus generated is then split between a wage to the
researcher, and profits to the firm:
φ(k, V ) = w(a) + π(L)
where wages for each ability level w(a) : A → R+ and profits as a function of lab size
π(L) : L → R+ are endogenous and determined in equilibrium.
Note that this specification abstracts away from competition in the product market. The
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reason is that firms may apply the same knowledge to very different products. For example,
all biotech firms benefit from the same scientific knowledge. However, some firms develop
DNA sequencing machines, some develop drugs and others develop bacteria that can produce
biofuel out of garbage. Some firms compete with each other, some complement each other,
and some belong to very different product markets. For this reason, I do not consider firms’
competition on the product market and focus on their competition for researchers.
Endogenous Science. The stock of public knowledge is taken as given by firms and re-






where m(L) : L ∪ 0 → A ∪ 0 assigns labs to researchers and is determined in equilibrium,
with m(L) = 0 representing an unmatched lab and m(0) = a representing an unmatched
researcher. L > 0 is the smallest lab that is matched, and is also determined in equilib-
rium.7 Finally, the parameter ν ≥ 0 captures both the size of knowledge spillovers, and the
possibility of complementaries between knowledge produced within different firms.
Note that, in general, it is possible that m(L) is a correspondence: two researchers with
different abilities are assigned to the same lab. We argue below that, in equilibrium, this is
possible only for a lab of size 0. That is, in equilibrium, two researchers of different abilities
may not be matched, but conditional on being matched there is a one-to-one correspondence
between researchers and labs. The notation used anticipates the fact that m(L) is a function
over the range of integration of (1).
The above specification implies that ability a and lab size L are complements in the
knowledge production function. In turn, this implies that the allocation of researchers to
labs that maximizes the aggregate production of knowledge is Positive Assortative Matching
(PAM), in which the most productive researcher is allocated to the biggest lab. This is a
key assumption that I will maintain throughout the paper. It is justified by the observation
that, when research funds are allocated by grant-giving institutions having the explicit goal
7 If the distribution of labs is exogenous, it is possible that some labs are unmatched and therefore idle in
equilibrium. However, when the distribution of labs is derived endogenously (see Section 3) no labs will be
unmatched in equilibrium, because a firm that anticipates not being able to hire a researcher will not build
a lab.
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of producing new knowledge, researchers who can demonstrate higher ability and better
past performance typically have a higher chance of receiving funds and are allocated larger
grants.8
Finally, the knowledge produced by a given firm may interact with the knowledge pro-
duced by other firms and determine the stock of public knowledge in complex ways. As




be desirable. As long as %() is not too curved, the two inputs in the knowledge-production
process remain complements. However, because the main results of the paper do not depend
on the specific shape of %(), for ease of exposition I only consider the linear case.9
Welfare. The total welfare of the economy is equal to the sum of all profits and all wages
earned, which is also equal to the sum of the surplus generated in each match:∫ L
L
φ(m(L)f(L), V )h(L)dL. (2)
The key observation is that, whereas firms and researchers take the total stock of knowledge
V as given, from the social point of view V is determined endogenously and depends on the
equilibrium matching pattern.
2.1 Equilibrium
I first consider the equilibrium on the labor market for researchers for given V .
Definition 1 (Partial Equilibrium). For given V , the functions m(L), π(L) and w(a) con-
stitute a partial equilibrium if the following two properties hold:
8 For example, Arora and Gambardella (2005) analyze the funding allocation decisions of NSF and show
that the reputation (past publication record) is positively correlated with the probability of being awarded the
grant and with the size of the grant. Arora, David, and Gambardella (1998) analyze the funding allocation
decisions of the Italian CNR (equivalent to NSF) and find similar results. They also show that the elasticity
of research output with respect of research budget is higher then average for prestigious scientists, which
implies complementarity between ability and funds.
9 The results do not depend on %() in the sense that, for any %(), if the marginal private-return on knowledge
production decreases fast enough, a and L are substitutes in the private surplus function (see Lemma 1),
and the equilibrium allocation may be inefficient (see Proposition 1). However, the exact curvature of φ(., .)
determining whether a and L are substitutes in the private surplus function depends on %().
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• Feasibility: π(L) + w(a) ≤ ΦV (a, L) ∀L ∈ L ∪ 0 and a ∈ m(L).
• Stability: π(L) + w(a′) ≥ ΦV (a′, L) ∀L,L′ ∈ L ∪ 0 and a′ ∈ m(L′).10
To understand the implication of this definition, note that feasibility and stability imply
that
ΦV (m(L), L)− w(m(L)) ≥ ΦV (a′, L)− w(a′) ∀L,L′ ∈ L ∪ 0 and a′ ∈ m(L′).
In other words, given V and the equilibrium wage function w(), each firm “shops for re-
searchers” in a competitive market.11 Profits are equal to the difference between the total
surplus and the wage paid. In equilibrium, each firm prefers to hire the researcher specified
by m() rather than any other researcher. For any given V , the existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium allocation m(L) is a standard result in matching theory. Also, because L
and a have continuous distributions, the equilibrium matching function m(L) is a bijection
for m(L) > 0: each L matched is matched with one and only one a. If in equilibrium some
researchers and some firms are not matched, then also w(a) and π(L) are unique. If instead
all researchers and all firms are matched, then there are multiple equilibrium w(a) and π(L),
depending on the payoff of the least productive researcher and of the firm with the smallest
lab. The payoff functions w(a) and π(L) are continuous (for all these results see, for example,
Kamecke, 1992). Finally, for future reference note that m(L) > 0 is a bijection from a closed
interval (the set of labs that are matched) to a closed interval (the set of researchers that are
matched). Hence, conditioned on L > 0, if m(L) is monotonic it must also be continuous.
Feasibility and stability define the equilibrium in the labor market for researchers for
given V . However, the stock on knowledge available in the economy is itself a function of
the matching function m(L), which implies the following definition.
Definition 2 (General Equilibrium). A given V , m(L), π(L) and w(a) constitute a general




10 Remember that, in general, m(L) could be a correspondence: two researchers with different abilities are
matched with the same lab. In equilibrium, this will happen for lab of size 0.
11 Note that stability and feasibility also imply that ΦV (m(L), L)−π(L) ≥ ΦV (m(L), L′)−π(L′). In other
words, we could equivalently imagine that researchers shop for firms.
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The existence of the general equilibrium is shown in Kaneko and Wooders (1996), who
consider a two-sided matching model with a continuum of players and widespread external-
ities. The general equilibrium may not be unique. The reason is that when a large V is
expected, more firms and more researchers will match, and the total knowledge produced
will be high. Instead, when a low V is expected, fewer firms and researchers will match, and
the total knowledge produced will be low. Note also that equilibria with larger V Pareto
dominate equilibria with lower V . When discussing the efficiency property of the equilib-
rium, I will always implicitly assume that general equilibrium of the economy is the Pareto
preferred one.
2.2 Solution
Despite the fact that ability and lab size are complements in the knowledge production func-
tion, whether they are complements or substitutes in the private surplus function depends










The first term on the RHS of the above expression is positive because ability and lab size are
complements in the production of knowledge. The second term is negative whenever there
are decreasing returns to knowledge creation. Thus, if the marginal return on knowledge
decreases fast enough, ability and lab size are substitutes in the surplus function.
To understand why, consider a simplified version of the model in which there are only
two firms L′, L′′ with L′ > L′′, and two researchers a′, a′′ with a′ > a′′. Because a and L are
complements in the knowledge production function, the increase in knowledge production
when hiring a′ instead of a′′ is larger for firm L′ than firm L′′. However, if the marginal
benefit from producing knowledge decreases fast enough, the increase in knowledge will be
more beneficial to L′′, which is the firm producing less knowledge when matched with either
researcher. It follows that the firm with the smallest lab benefits the most from matching
with a productive researcher. If instead the marginal benefit from producing knowledge
decreases slowly enough, the firm with the largest lab benefits the most from matching with
a productive researcher.
The following lemma shows that a and L are local substitutes or local complements
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depending on whether ∂φ
∂k
decreases faster or slower than ∂ log(k)
∂k
.
Lemma 1. Consider the equilibrium matching function m(L) and a given L̂ such that m(L)
is differentiable at L̂. Define k̂ = m(L̂)f(L̂).
• the equilibrium is local NAM (i.e. m′(L̂) < 0) if and only if for k in the neighborhood
of k̂, φ(k, V ) = χ(log(k), V ) where χ(., .) : R2 → R is strictly increasing and concave
in log(k).
• the equilibrium is local PAM (i.e. m′(L̂) > 0) if an only if for k in the neighborhood of
k̂, φ(k, V ) = χ(log(k), V ) where χ(., .) : R2 → R is strictly increasing and convex in
log(k).
The following proposition derives conditions under which a and L are global substitutes
or global complements in the private surplus function.
Proposition 1. Define k ≡ af(L) as the maximum amount of knowledge that can be pro-
duced by any firm.
1. If φ(k, V ) = χ(log(k), V )∀k ≤ k with χ(., .) : R2 → R strictly increasing and concave
in log(k), then in equilibrium m′(L) < 0 for every L that is matched (i.e. global
NAM.) If ν is sufficiently large this equilibrium is inefficient: social welfare can be
increased by implementing PAM somewhere.
2. If φ(k, V ) = χ(log(k), V )∀k ≤ k with χ(., .) : R2 → R strictly increasing and convex
in log(k), then in equilibrium m′(L) > 0 for every L that is matched (i.e. global
PAM.) This equilibrium is efficient: it is not possible to re-allocate researchers to labs
and increase welfare.
Hence, if the marginal return on knowledge decreases everywhere faster than a logarithmic
function, the equilibrium matching pattern is global NAM, in which the least productive
researcher among the ones who are hired is allocated to the largest lab. In this case, if ν is
sufficiently large the equilibrium matching pattern is inefficient: welfare can be improved by
reallocating some researchers.12 On the other hand, when ν is close to zero, it is possible
12 More precisely: because multiple equilibria are possible, if ν is sufficiently large any equilibrium matching
pattern is inefficient.
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that both in equilibrium and in the first best no researcher is hired and no knowledge is
produced.
Conversely, if the marginal return on knowledge decreases everywhere slower than a
logarithmic function, the equilibrium matching pattern is global PAM: the best researcher is
allocated to the largest lab. In this case, firms and researchers are simultaneously maximizing
their individual payoffs and the positive externality they generate. It follows that if PAM is
the equilibrium allocation, it must also be the efficient allocation.
Note that, in general, the marginal return on knowledge may somewhere decrease faster
than a logarithmic function and somewhere slower, and therefore we may be outside the cases
considered by Proposition 1. When this happens, a and L are somewhere local complements,
and somewhere local substitutes in φ(af(L), V ). The equilibrium matching pattern will
depend on the distribution of labs and researchers’ ability, and may be PAM, NAM, or PAM
over some range and NAM over some other range. In these cases, it is possible to derive the
equilibrium only via numerical methods.
To summarize, the fact that knowledge is a public good may or may not imply that the
allocation of researchers to labs is inefficient. The key determinant of whether welfare can
be improved by re-allocating researchers to firms is the speed at which the marginal private
return on k decreases with k.
2.3 First best
A natural question is how to restore efficiency. We can apply here the results in Hammond
(1995, Section 6), who considers a large economy with widespread externalities and shows a
combination of a Pigouvian subsidy and Lindahl taxes can achieve the first best allocation.
In our framework, this result implies that the social planner should impose a Lindahl tax
on the public knowledge consumed by firm i equal to Ti = ∂φ(V,af(L))∂V |V=V ∗ , that is firm
i’s marginal benefit of public knowledge V evaluated at its first best level V ∗. Simultane-
ously, the social planner should impose a Pigouvian subsidy on firms’ contribution to public
knowledge equal to the average Lindahl tax τ =
∫
Tih(L)d(L).
To understand the effect of Ti and τ , it is useful to think of the equilibrium as a situation
in which firms “shop for researchers” in a competitive market. In this case, each firm’s
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profit-maximization problem is
{m(L), V } = argmaxa,V {φ(V, af(L)) + τ · ν · af(L)− TiV − w(a)} .








or V = V ∗. That is, the “price” for public knowledge Ti is such that each firm will demand
exactly its first best-level V ∗. It follows that, in the competitive equilibrium with Pigouvian
subsidy and Lindahl taxes, it must be that V = V ∗.13
Given this, and using the expression for the Pigouvian subsidy τ , the marginal benefit of
knowledge production k = af(L) is
∂φ(V, k)
∂k
|V=V ∗ + τv =
∂φ(V, k)
∂k







which is equal to the marginal social benefit of knowledge production evaluated at V ∗ (see
equation 2). It follows that each firm internalizes the benefit that its own investment in
knowledge generates on other firms, under the expectation that all other firms will contribute
the first-best level of knowledge.14 Finally, note that this scheme is budget-neutral, because
the amount paid as Pigouvian subsidy equals the amount collected by the Lindahl taxes.
The equilibrium matching pattern now depends on whether a and L are complements or
substitutes in
φ(V, af(L)) + τ · ν · af(L).
If a and L are complements in φ(V, af(L)), then they are complements also in the above
expression and, as we already know, PAM is the efficient allocation. If a and L are substitutes
in φ(V, af(L)), from the social point of view a and L may be somewhere complements and
somewhere substitutes. The optimal allocation of researchers to labs exists and is unique,
13 The existence of the competitive equilibrium with Pigouvian subsidy and Lindahl taxes is in Hammond
(1995).
14 Note an important point. The Pigouvian subsidy guarantees that for given V the equilibrium allocation
is efficient conditional on V . But this gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria, some of them with an
inefficient level of V . Lindahl taxes guarantee that the equilibrium is unique at V = V ∗. See also Hammond
(1995, Section 7) for a full discussion on this point.
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but can only be derived numerically and may involve implementing PAM over some range
and NAM over some other range. Intuitively, the social planner may balance production of
knowledge and profit maximization by implementing PAM across some firm and NAM across
some other firms. Of course, the social planner can achieve the first best also by directly
allocating researchers to firms.
2.4 Discussion: absorptive capacity
Is it reasonable to expect the equilibrium matching pattern in the labor market of researchers
to be NAM? To explore this question, I restrict my attention to φ(k, V ) that are isoelastic





≡ σ ∀k, V. (3)
Under this restriction, if σ < 0 the equilibrium allocation is NAM, while if σ > 0 the
equilibrium allocation is PAM. Importantly, this does not depend on the distribution of labs
and researchers. Hence, (3) guarantees that the shape of φ(k, V ) is the only determinant
of the equilibrium matching pattern. Note also that σ < 0 is equivalent to φ(k, V ) being
bounded above in k, while σ > 0 is equivalent to φ(k, V ) being unbounded above in k.
Hence, under (3) the above question can be restated as: are there reasons to believe that
firms’ private benefit of knowledge production is bounded above?
One possible reason is absorptive capacity. According to Rosenberg (1990, p. 170):
Knowledge is regarded by economists as being “on the shelf ” and costlessly avail-
able to all comers once it has been produced. But this model is seriously flawed
because it frequently requires a substantial research capability to understand, in-
terpret and to appraise knowledge that has been placed upon the shelf.
A large literature has since argued that firms’ absorptive capacity—that is, their ability
to use the available stock of science—increases with the amount of knowledge produced
internally (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, and the papers discussed in Section 1). This
view implies that, if absorptive capacity is the only motive for knowledge production, then
φ(k, V ) has an upper bound in k given by the limit case in which the stock of knowledge V
is costlessly available to the firm. In this case, therefore, we should expect the equilibrium
matching pattern in the labor market of researchers to be NAM.
3 Endogenous labs 16
Of course, producing knowledge may be beneficial to a firm beyond the increase in its
absorptive capacity. For example, the knowledge produced may be directly beneficial to the
firm, in which case there is no presumption that φ(k, V ) is bounded above. In general, the
shape of φ(k, V ) depends on several elements that are not part of the model, such as each
firm’s market share, the IP regimes, the market structure. Whether in a given sector φ(k, V )
is bounded above is ultimately an empirical question. However, the literature discussed in
the introduction has found evidence of NAM in the labor market for researchers. In light of
the model, absorptive capacity is a plausible mechanism to explain this empirical fact.
3 Endogenous labs
In this section I add a period in which firms invest in labs. I will show that, taking as given
the researchers they will be matched with, firms build labs that are smaller than the socially
optimal size. Furthermore, because the level of investment depends on the researcher each
firm expects to hire, if the equilibrium allocation of researchers to labs is inefficient there
is an interesting interaction between the inefficiency arising in the matching stage and the
inefficiency arising in the investment phase. I will also derive conditions for the existence of
the competitive equilibrium with endogenous labs.
Initially, firms differ in their productivity p which is continuously distributed over P =
[0, p̄] with p.d.f. γ(p). In period t = 0, firms build labs at cost c(p, L) continuous, positive,
with continuous first and second derivative, strictly increasing and strictly convex in L
with limL→∞ ∂c(p,L)∂L = ∞ ∀p, strictly decreasing in p with limp→0
∂c(p,L)
∂L
= ∞ ∀L, and with
c(p, 0) = 0 ∀p.
Therefore, p represents a firm’s comparative advantage in investing in labs. For example,
although not explicitly considered here, some firms may be active in multiple scientific fields
and labor markets for researchers. It is possible that those firms benefit from economies of
scale when building labs, and therefore have higher p compared to firms that are active in
only one scientific field.15
Following the investment in labs, events unfold as described in the previous section. In
15 Whenever firms are identical, the results that are the same as the ones presented here, but the derivations
are more convoluted. The reason is that, in this case, identical firms behave differently depending on what
researcher they expect to be matched with. Hence, the equilibrium investment in labs is a correspondence
and not a function.
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period 1 each firm hires one researcher and produces new knowledge k = af(L); in the
last period surplus ΦV (a, L) = φ(k, V ) is generated, which is then split between profits and
wages. See Figure 1.
Invest in labs
t = 0
Match and produce knowledge
t = 1
Generate surplus; split surplus
t = 2
Fig. 1: Timeline
Welfare For a given m(L) and given investment in labs by each firm i(p) (which will be
determined in equilibrium), total welfare now has to account for the cost of building labs




[φ(m(i(p))f(i(p)), V )− c(p, i(p))] γ(p)dP, (4)
where p is the least productive firm building a lab of strictly positive size, also determined
in equilibrium. Again, whereas firms and researchers take the total stock of knowledge V
as given, from the social point of view V is determined endogenously and depends both on
firms’ investment decisions and on the equilibrium matching pattern.
3.1 Equilibrium with investment in labs
I introduce the following notation:
• i(p) : P ⇒ R+, the investment made by firm p, determining the size of this firm’s lab.
• m̃(p) ≡ m(i(p)) : P ⇒ A, the matching rule on the equilibrium path (for labs built by
some firms) mapping firms to researchers.
• π̃(p) ≡ π(i(p)) : P → R+, firms’ profits on the equilibrium path.
• l(a) ≡ i(m̃−1(a)) the lab a researcher of ability a receives in equilibrium.
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The definition of equilibrium that I use is similar to the one in Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001) with the difference that, here, the investment in labs generates a positive
externality on the other firms.
Definition 3 (Equilibrim with investment in labs). A given {V, i(.),m(.), π(.), w(.)} consti-
tutes an equilibrium if the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. The investment is optimal:
i(p) = arg max
L≥0
{π(L)− c(p, L)}
2. Ex post, the matching is feasible and stable, where:
• Feasibility: π̃(p) + w(a) ≤ ΦV (a, i(p)) ∀p ∈ P and a ∈ m̃(p).16
• Stability: π̃(p) + w(a′) ≥ ΦV (a′, i(p)) ∀p, p′ ∈ P and a′ ∈ m̃(p′).
3. For L /∈ {L : L = i(p) for some p ∈ P} (investments off the equilibrium path):
π(L) = maxa {ΦV (a, L)− w(a)}
4. V = ν
∫
af(l(a))z(a)da (remember that z(a) is the p.d.f. of a).
To understand the definition, assume that there is an equilibrium, and consider a de-
viation made by a single firm. Because there is a continuum of firms, any change in the
investment level of a single firm does not affect the distribution of labs, and has no impact
on the equilibrium w(a). In other words, firms are price takers in the market for researchers,
both for on-equilibrium and off-equilibrium investment levels. Therefore, when choosing the
investment level, each firm takes w(a) as given. In addition, regardless of the size of the
lab built, each firm can match with any researcher a provided that it pays the market wage
w(a).
16 The general definition of feasibility is more complicated (see Cole et al., 2001). However, here this
simpler version can be used because all distributions are continuous.
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3.2 Solution
I can now solve for the equilibrium investment in labs and equilibrium stock of public knowl-
edge.





Proof. By applying the envelope theorem to point 1 and 3 of the definition of the equilibrium.







Hence, firms’ investments maximize surplus taking as given V and the researchers they will
hire in equilibrium. Because the social planner would take into account the impact of the
individual investment in L on the stock of public knowledge, Lemma 2 implies that, for given
researcher’s ability a, the investment is inefficient.
Furthermore, the lemma also implies that the matching pattern expected to emerge in
the following period affects firms’ investment decisions. If ∂
2ΦV (a,L)
∂L∂a
< 0, then the equilib-
rium matching pattern is NAM, and the investment in labs is distorted for two reasons:
because the firm does not internalize the effect of its investment on V , and because the firm
anticipates that the researcher hired is not the first best one. If the researcher hired is more
productive than the first best researcher, then the two effects work in the same direction: the
misallocation or researchers causes this firm to underinvest relative to the social optimum.
If the researcher hired is less productive than the first best researcher, then the two effects
work in opposite directions: the mismatch in the labor market causes this firm to overinvest
in labs, while for given researcher this firm is underinvesting in labs.
To show the existence of the general equilibrium, I restrict my attention to the two
cases considered in Proposition 1, so that the matching pattern is either NAM or PAM,
independently from the distribution of labs and V . I also will use the following fact:
Lemma 3. i(p) is a continuous function.
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Call p(V ) the least productive firm building a lab of positive size as a function of V . This
firm earns zero profits in equilibrium, and therefore
p(V ) ≡ min {p, p : π̃(p) = c(p, i(p))}
Note that the higher is V , the larger the surplus to be shared and the payoff of each firm.
It follows that p(V ) is decreasing in V . However, because the marginal cost of investing
becomes arbitrarily large for arbitrarily small p, we have that p(V ) > 0 ∀V . Finally, p(V ) is
continuous because π(L), m(L) and i(p) are continuous.
Similarly, call V (p) the total knowledge produced as a function of the least productive
firm building a lab of positive size, that is
V (p) ≡ V : V =
∫ p
p
ν · m̃(p)f(i(p))γ(p)dp, (6)
By equation (5), i(p) depends on V , which implies that (6) could have multiple or no solu-
tions. I therefore need to impose some additional restrictions:
Assumption 1. L solution to (5)
• is strictly greater than zero at V = 0 for some p > 0,
• is either decreasing in V or strictly concave in V .
Note that these restrictions relate to the optimal investment made by firms conditional
on investing. That is, it is possible that there is a corner solution and the profit maximizing
level of investment at V = 0 is zero, and at the same time the first part of the assumption is
satisfied because the investment level that satisfies equation (5) is positive. By the implicit








Because, by assumption ∂
2ΦV (a,L)
∂L2
< 0, whenever L and V are substitutes in ΦV (a, L) then
the above expression is negative and the second part of the Assumption 1 is satisfied. If
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instead L and V are strict complements in ΦV (a, L), Assumption 1 is satisfied only if the
above expression is decreasing in V .
Lemma 4. If Assumption 1 holds, then V (p) exists, is unique and is continuous in p.
Under the assumption 1, V (p) reaches a maximum level at p = 0, decreasing in p, and
is zero at p = p. Note also that V (p) shifts upward whenever ν increases. The curves V (p)
and p(V ) are plotted in Figures 2 and 3, which differ for the fact that ν (and therefore V (p))
is higher in Figure 3 than in Figure 2. The shapes and continuity of V (p) and p(V ) imply
that they must cross at least one, leading to the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that we are in one of the two cases considered in Proposition 1.
Under Assumption 1 the competitive equilibrium of the economy always exists. If the value
of research ν is high enough, equilibria where a positive amount of knowledge is produced
exist.












Fig. 3: High ν, equilibria with V > 0.
Finally, note that the combination of a Pigouvian tax and Lidahl subsidies discussed in
Section 2.3 aligns the social benefit of building labs with its private benefit, and therefore
achieves the first best also when the distribution of labs is endogenous. The social planner
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can achieve the first best also by imposing the efficient allocation of researchers to labs, and
imposing an appropriate subsidy to the investment in labs. Only imposing a subsidy in labs,
however, cannot restore efficiency, as the discussion in Section 2.3 shows.
4 Extension: Reputation Concerns.
In the benchmark model, I implicitly assumed that the creation of new knowledge generates
only monetary benefits, which can be freely split between firms and researchers. However,
since the work of Merton (1957), it is well known that researchers care about reputation.
Merton calls scientists’ concern for reputation the race for priority : researchers want to be
recognized as the first to discover something. The role of reputation in the production of
knowledge was explored in the economic literature by Dasgupta and David (1985). They
argue that, on the one hand, reputation motivates researchers, which is important because
an incentive scheme based exclusively on the quality of scientific output would be hard to
implement. On the other hand, reputation fosters openness, which guarantees the circulation
of ideas and generates a faster pace of scientific progress.
In this section, I introduce reputation into the model as an additional output of R&D, and
I show that reputation may affect the production of knowledge in a new way: by changing
the equilibrium allocation of researchers to firms. The reason is that reputation accrues to
the researcher but cannot be transferred back to the firm because of liquidity constraints, and
therefore transforms the matching problem in a Non-Transferrable Utility (NTU) problem
(see Legros and Newman, 2007).17 I show that NTU has the usual effect on the equilibrium
matching: if it is strong enough it will generate a PAM allocation. More interestingly, here
NTU may actually improve welfare because PAM is the knowledge-maximizing allocation of
researchers to labs.
Formally, I assume that the researchers’ utility is:
U(a) = w(a) + ρΦV (a, L)
where w(a) ≥ 0 is the monetary payment received and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of surplus
17 NTU can arise in many other cases. For example, if researchers’ effort impact the value of the science
produced and firms cannot implement incentive schemes depending on the value of output, the particular
surplus split agreed ex ante determines total surplus.
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that accrue to the researcher as reputation. By assumption ρΦV (a, L) cannot be shared with
the firm. The remaining fraction of surplus (1− ρ)ΦV (a, L) accrues to the firm, and can be
shared with the researcher.18
Lemma 5. If ρ is sufficiently large, the equilibrium matching is PAM.
Intuitively, the “reputation component” of the researcher’s utility is increasing in the
knowledge produced. Hence researchers are willing to give up their cash payments to produce
more knowledge, the more so the larger is ρ.19 When ρ is large enough cash payments are
zero, and the payoff for both sides (firms and researchers) increases with the other side’s
type, and the equilibrium matching is PAM.
For given distribution of labs, the fact that reputation concerns change the equilibrium
matching from NAM to PAM has two effects on welfare. For given V firms’ private surplus
will decrease, but the stock of public knowledge V will increase. The net effect will depend
on the parameter ν (measuring the value of a unit of new knowledge), and is positive as long
as ν is sufficiently large.
Finally, reputation has an effect on the investment made by firms. As ρ increases, both
the benefit and marginal benefit from investing in labs may decrease, because the fraction of
surplus that is in monetary form and can be transferred to firms decreases. However, when
a firm’s investment is sufficiently inelastic, the overall welfare effect of reputation concerns is





for ∆ large enough guarantees that firms will
invest L ≈ p regardless of the value of ρ. To summarize: if firms investment is sufficiently
inelastic and ν is sufficiently large the introduction of reputation concerns increases total
welfare.
18 In an alternative specification the researcher’s utility could depend directly on k. Also in this case, the
fact that part of the surplus is not sharable will push the equilibrium toward PAM. In addition to that, if the
researcher cares directly about k, then there is a supermodular element in the researcher’s payoff function,
which again pushes the equilibrium toward PAM. Hence, both specifications lead to the same equilibrium
allocation. However, the specification chosen here allows for a more immediate comparison of the welfare
properties of the equilibrium with and without reputation concerns, because reputation does not change the
total surplus generated in a match, but only how this surplus is allocated.
19 This finding is consistent with Stern (2004). In his paper “Do Scientists Pay to be Scientists?” the author
collects data on job offers received by a sample of biology Ph.D. job market candidates. He finds that firms
engaged in scientific research offer wages 25% lower than firms that are not engaged in scientific research.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, I build a model of knowledge production in which firms invest in labs and hire
researchers on a competitive market, and I analyze the competitive allocation of researchers.
I show that whenever the marginal private benefit of firms’ R&D activities decreases suffi-
ciently fast, scientific talent may be misallocated in equilibrium. In case of misallocation,
subsidies to the investment in labs cannot restore full efficiency as they do not affect the
equilibrium matching pattern. There is scope for policies that distort the market allocation
of researchers, because reallocating researchers from one firm to another firm may generate
an aggregate welfare gain (in addition to a local gain and a local loss).
I also show that the presence of reputation concerns may change the equilibrium matching
pattern to PAM: good researchers work in big labs because they benefit directly from their
research output. It follows that reputation concerns may increase the aggregated knowledge
produced and total welfare. It also follows that the empirical matching patterns between
researchers and labs should depend on the strength of researchers’ reputation concerns. For
example, assuming that reputation concerns are stronger for young researchers, we should
observe productive young researchers working for firms with large labs, but productive old
researchers working for firms with small labs.
Finally, I characterize the optimal allocation of researchers to labs only partially. I show
that whenever the allocation of researchers to firms is inefficient, it is possible to increase
total welfare by re-allocating productive researchers from small labs to larger labs. However,
the first-best allocation of researchers to firms depends on the exact distribution of labs and
researchers’ ability, and may involve PAM over some range and NAM over some other range.
Deriving the first-best re-allocation policy and describing which researcher should move to
what lab is left for future work.
Appendix: mathematical derivations.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By standard matching theory, local substitutability implies local NAM, and local
complementarity implies local PAM. Substitutability or complementarity at a given â =
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(i.e. χ(, ) is concave in its first argument) and positive otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The fact the the equilibrium is global PAM/NAM depending on whether χ(, ) is
globally convex/concave in its first argument follows immediately from Lemma 1.
To show that global NAM is inefficient if ν is large, I prove the following stronger state-
ment: that local NAM is inefficient for ν sufficiently large. Consider an equilibrium matching
functionm(L) and assume thatm′(L̂) < 0 at some L̂. Consider an alternative matching func-
tion mε(L) with mε(L) = m(L) for L /∈ [L̂− ε, L̂+ ε], and m′ε(L) > 0 for all L ∈ [L̂− ε, L̂+ ε]
for some ε > 0 small. In other words, the alternative matching function is a perturbation of
the the equilibrium matching function, and implements PAM instead of NAM in the interval
[L̂ − ε, L̂ + ε]. Call V the stock of aggregate knowledge produced under the equilibrium
matching function m(L), and Vε stock of aggregate knowledge produced under the matching
function mε(L).
When the matching function is perturbed in the way described above, the change in the
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>0
Note that for some firms ∂[m(L)L]
∂ε
< 0: under the alternative matching function some firms





> 0 for all ε > 0: the total stock of public knowledge is greater when local
NAM is transformed into local PAM. The parameter ν measures the value of the new knowl-
edge produced. When it is sufficiently large, the effect of a perturbation in the matching
function on the surplus generated by a given firm is positive, even for firms that are matched
with a worse researcher.
Hence, for ν is sufficiently large, implementing the alternative matching function increases
the surplus generates by each firm in the economy. It follows that total surplus is greater
under the alternative matching function rather than the equilibrium matching function.
To conclude the proof, I need to show that if PAM is the equilibrium, then the equilibrium
is efficient. This follows simply from the fact that the equilibrium maximizes surplus for
given V. At the same time PAM maximizes V . Because surplus is increasing in V , PAM also
maximizes surplus.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By point 1 of the definition of equilibrium, i(p) > 0 solves π′(L) = ∂c(p,L)
∂L
. By Lemma
2, π′′(L) = ∂
2ΦV (a,L)
∂L2
< 0, while by definition ∂
2c(p,L)
∂L2
> 0 with limL→∞ ∂c(p,L)∂L =∞ ∀p. Hence,
there is always a unique L that satisfies π′(L) = ∂c(p,L)
∂L
. Continuity follows from the fact
that π(L) and c(p, L) are continuous with continuous first derivatives, and therefore firm’s
optimal investment is also continuous.




Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Here I take as given that firms in [p, p] build labs of strictly positive size. Because








ν · m̃(p)f(i(p))γ(p)dp is either decreasing or strictly concave in V .
Which imply that V =
∫ p
p
ν · m̃(p)f(i(p))γ(p)dp has a unique solution, which is continuous
because i(.), m(.), γ(.), f(.) are continuous.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Consider a given V and a given distribution of labs. Suppose that, in equilibrium,
the equilibrium is PAM and researchers receive no cash payments: their full payoff is in form
of reputation. In this equilibrium, the only possible deviation for a research is to move to a
firm with a smaller lab and capture a positive monetary payoff. Consider the best researcher
a, that is matched with the firm with the largest lab L. This researcher could work for the
firm with the smallest lab and receive a cash payment equal to the entire surplus generated
within this match. This deviation is not profitable as long as:
ρΦ(a, L) > Φ(a, L)
If this deviation is not profitable for the most productive researcher it is not profitable
for any researcher. Furthermore, for any V and any distribution of labs, we always have
Φ(a, L) > Φ(a, L). Hence, if ρ is sufficiently close to 1, the equilibrium is PAM for any V
and any distribution of labs.
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